Security and Dynamic Encryption System in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network by Peter H. Yu & Udo W. Pooch
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
23 
Security and Dynamic Encryption System in 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Network  
Peter H. Yu and Udo W. Pooch 
Texas A&M University, Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
College Station, TX  
USA 
1. Introduction    
Wireless network technology enables computing devices to communicate with each other 
without any physical medium. Compared with wired networks, wireless communication 
provides better connectivity and mobility, which allows mobile devices to access other local 
area networks or the Internet at anytime and anywhere. The benefits of flexible routing, 
global connectivity and a highly adaptive potential make mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET) 
suitable for a wide range of applications in both military and commercial environments, 
such as battlefields, disaster relief operations, mobile device/ personal networking, mobile 
information sharing and vehicular networks (Kant et al., 2005); (Liu et al., 2007).  
However, maintaining security in wireless ad-hoc networks is quite challenging. First, 
unlike wired networks that at least have some degree of physical protection, wireless 
communication over radio waves lacks defined and restricted boundaries. Anyone can 
connect to the network as long as the transmitted signal strength is strong enough to cover 
the area (Chan et al., 2005), and therefore, security attacks on data communication, such as 
passive eavesdropping, packet injection or even violations of confidentiality are widespread. 
Second, the end-to-end communication in MANET cannot rely on any fixed infrastructure, 
such as a base station or access points (AP); thus, existing security protocols that are based 
on a centralized or infrastructure-based network environment will not work in this mobile 
environment (Hubaux et al., 2001). 
Third, in order to achieve better network throughput in such a highly dynamic 
environment, the default routing protocol does not implement any security protection 
during end-to-end communication. In addition, the trust relationships between each node 
are very low as a consequence of the frequently changing topology and membership. 
Because of this, many attacks can be launched against the routing protocol, giving hackers a 
major opportunity to insert themselves as one of the cooperative nodes in the network. 
Therefore, the security protection that is used to ensure the integrity of the mobile ad-hoc 
network should not only repel external attacks, but also prevent internal attacks launched 
against the network from any compromised node.  
Most security mechanisms rely on data encryption, which is a message combined with a 
secret key to generate a ciphertext that cannot be revived without the original key. This 
encryption mechanism can prevent any unauthorized user from gaining access to the 
secured communication. However, a fixed secret key is vulnerable to deciphering by 
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capturing sufficient packets or by launching a dictionary attack. Therefore, the most efficient 
way to protect the network from such attacks is to generate the secret key dynamically and 
replace it periodically (Ramakrishnan et al., 2005). Furthermore, the protocol applied to the 
mobile ad-hoc wireless network should be sufficiently flexible to adjust to different levels of 
security protection to fit the needs of applications in different environments and with varied 
communication speeds. For example, mobile banking and E-commerce require larger 
encryption keys for stronger protection, while real-time driven applications such as disaster 
recovery, stream services like VOIP and online video need to preserve data privacy as well 
as performance to maintain the quality of services (QoS). 
In this chapter, we introduced a new, efficient, low-bandwidth cost and security-enhancing 
data encryption i-key protocol for mobile ad-hoc wireless networks via dynamic re-keying 
during end-to-end communication. Unlike its counterparts, this secret i-key is generated 
using the previous data as the seed and as next packet encryption before delivery; therefore, 
only the original sender and authorized client are able to decrypt the message using the 
unique i-key in their possession, which ensures the privacy of their communication.  
2. Related work 
Wired Equivalent Privacy, or WEP, is an encryption protocol designed by the IEEE 802.11 
and Home RF group (Lansford & Bahl, 2000) in an attempt to protect link-level data over 
radio signals for wireless networks, included both Base Station (BS)-oriented and mobile ad-
hoc networks, to the security level closer to wired one. The WEP key used to encrypt data 
sent over wireless networks consists of two parts: the Initialization Vector (IV) and user pre-
shared secret key (PSK). The stream cipher, RC4 used in WEP, expands the IV (40 or 104 
bits) and PSK into an arbitrary long "key stream" of pseudorandom bits then XOR with the 
plaintext to obtain the ciphertext. To decrypt it, the receiver side takes the same steps in the 
reverse order by the same key stream. In addition, a CRC-32 algorithm is applied to check 
the data integrity for each data packet in WEP encryption.  
Many WEP vulnerabilities and security design issues has been discovered and reported by 
researchers since the IEEE released it as the standard encryption protocol for 802.11 wireless 
networks (Gast, 2002); (Miller, 2001); (Prasithsangaree & P. Krishnamurthy, 2004); (J. S. Park 
& Dicoi, 2003). Therefore, wide attention has been paid by many researchers to the design of 
new protocols to secure the mobile ad hoc network, such as ARIADNE, DSDV, SEAD, 
ARAN and SPR (Hu et al., 2005); (Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994); (Hu et al., 2003); (Sanzgiri et al., 
2005); (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2002) to provide a solutions for the wireless ad-hoc 
networks. 
Hu et al. developed a secure routing protocol called ARIADNE (Alliance of Remote 
Instructional Authoring and Distributed Networks for Europe) (Hu et al., 2005), which relies 
on Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) (Johnson et al., 2002) and symmetric 
cryptography architecture for end-to-end authentication. On the other hand, based on 
DSDV (Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector Routing) (Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994), Hu and 
Perrig have proposed the proactive routing protocol SEND (Secure Efficient Ad-hoc 
Distance vector) (Hu et al., 2003), which runs under a trusted ad-hoc network environment. 
In order to lower the node’s CPU processing time and achieve better performance, SEND 
uses one-way public-key signed hash functions instead of asymmetric cryptography. 
Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Network (ARAN) by Sanzgiri et al. (Sanzgiri et al., 2005) 
detects and protects the ad hoc network against malicious actions with help from its parties’ 
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or peers’ nodes by using pre-determined public key cryptography certificates. However, 
compared with SEND, ARAN requires a higher computational cost in each node to retain 
the hop-by-hop authentication. 
Using a different approach, SRP (Secure Routing Protocol) (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2002) 
assures correct connectivity information as well as route discovery by rejecting fabricated, 
compromised or replayed route replies. SRP assumes a security association between the pair 
of end-points only, without the need for intermediate nodes to cryptographically validate 
control traffic (Sanzgiri et al., 2005); (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2002). 
Those protocols and traditional security approaches, such as authentication, digital 
certificates and public-key encryption algorithm, still play important roles in achieving data 
privacy, integrity, non-repudiation and availability of communication in mobile ad-hoc 
networks (Zhou & Haas, 1999). However, these mechanisms by themselves are not 
sufficient, either in terms of computational or communication overhead or lack of ability to 
prevent attacks launched from inside the network. Therefore, there remains a need for a 
lightweight and reliable security enhancement protocol for mobile ad-hoc wireless network. 
3. Routing and dynamic encryption protocol 
3.1 Routing 
In an ad-hoc wireless network, routing strategies can be classified as proactive or on-
demand (reactive). With proactive protocols, such as Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector 
Routing (DSDV) (Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994) and Optimized Link State Routing Protocol 
(OLSR) (Clausen et al., 2003); (Clausen & Jacquet, 2003), the packets route information that is 
periodically exchanged among hosts, allowing each node to build a global routing table 
without considering the usage of routing information. In the on-demand approach, such as 
Ad-hoc Network On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) (Perkins & Royer, 1999) and 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) (Johnson et al., 2001), the nodes build and maintain routes 
as needed and only toward the nodes involved in the routing, instead of continuously 
calculating routes in the background. 
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Fig. 1. AODV routing protocol with RREQ and RREP control message 
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AODV is adapted as the default routing protocol in this dynamic encryption model for the 
ad-hoc networking because of its high performance and low overhead, which are very 
important when considering that bandwidth is very limited in wireless communication. In 
AODV, as shown in Fig. 1. above, the source node first broadcasts a route request (RREQ) 
message to all adjacent nodes and waits for the corresponding route reply (RREP) message 
from the destination node to establish routing information. This request and reply query 
cycle will continue as long as this particular path is not listed in the routing table. Once 
routes have been built from source to destination, they will continue to be maintained as 
long as they are needed by the source node. All wireless packets between these two parties 
will follow the pre-build routing information and will be forwarded node by node until they 
reach the final destination. When the communication ends, the links will time out and 
eventually be removed from the table to release space for other routing paths. 
3.2 i-key protocol procedures 
This i-key protocol is primarily based on a dynamic re-keying mechanism that ensures the 
privacy of communication and prevents unauthorized users from accessing protected data 
over wireless communication. The key management and cipher stream system in i-key 
architecture is similar to Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) used in WPA/ WPA2 and 
RC4 used in Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) (Lansford & Bahl, 2000), in which each 
encryption key contains a pre-shared key (PSK) and a randomly selected key value from the 
Initialization Vector (IV) pool. In addition to these two keys, an extra dynamic secret i-key is 
applied to the cipher stream that is used to encrypt every data packet before transmission. 
Fig. 2. illustrates the key stream that is combined with these three different keys and the 
block diagram of i-key encryption and decryption algorithm. The dynamic i-key is generated 
according to the previous data packet and therefore only the sender and authorized 
recipient are able to decrypt the cipher text by the key stream that is combined with the 
dynamic i-key and static key to reveal the plaintext in the data packet, which becomes the 
new seed of the i-key used in the next data encryption. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Block diagram of i-key secure protocol 
Once routing information and initial handshaking are established for communication 
between the source mobile node (SMN) and destination mobile node (DMN), the dynamic i-
key encryption protocol for the wireless ad-hoc network will execute, as seen in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3. Dynamic i-key encryption and decryption protocol procedures 
Step 1. First, the source node S checks the destination node D on its routing information to 
confirm the proper routing rules been established. Then, source node S generates 
the secret i-key, which is based on the data as the seed contained on the first packet 
┙, and keeps this particular secret key to decrypt the next encrypted packet from 
destination node D. A combination of pre-shared secret key PSK and one unique IV 
value is applied for the stream cipher to encrypt the plaintext before routing an 
adjacent mobile ad-hoc node to relay to the destination node D. Of all the 
communication between source node and destination node, this is the first and only 
packet that does not use the dynamic i-key for data encryption; however, the 
security protection remains strong since it needs at least two packets with the 
identical IV value to decode the pre-shard key. Each value in the IV pool is 
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generated randomly and uniquely to strengthen the encryption cipher stream and 
preventing people from cracking it even they are able to capture those wireless 
packets. 
Step 2. The destination node D obtains the data packet ┙ as well as the i-key ┙ after running 
a decryption for this encrypted packet from source node S. It will then apply this 
dynamic i-key ┙ to the next data packet’s cipher stream to enhance security (because 
the source node S is the only one that has the same unique secret i-key ┙ in this 
wireless ad-hoc network). Before sending the response/ reply packet ┚ back to the 
source node by the same routing strategy, the destination node D will also generate 
the next i-key ┚ based on data in the packet in order to decode the next arrival. From 
this point forward, every data packet and communication from one side to another 
in this wireless environment is secured by a dynamic stream cipher that has triple 
layers of protection: one pre-shared secret key psk, one unique IV and one dynamic 
i-key possessed only by the original source and destination node.  
Step 3. The source node S will use the i-key ┙, generated in Step 1 and which it alone knows, 
to decode the cipher text along with the pre-shared secret key psk and IV to acquire 
the data ┚ in the packet that it receives from destination node D. The encryption 
procedure with i-key in Step 2 will repeat again for the next data packet before node 
S sends it to the destination node D to enhance the security and maintain the data 
integrity from malicious modification.  
Step 4. In cases when node S has more than one data packet to send before it gets a 
response, the destination node D will apply the corresponding i-key to decode the 
cipher text in accordance with the order of the arrival packets and update i-key 
based on the sequence number in each packet’s header to ascertain that the 
decrypted cipher stream matches the arrival packet and thus passes the integrity 
checksum in the payload after decryption.  
These i-key dynamic encryption/ decryption procedures will continue running and applying 
to every packet that is transmitted in the mobile ad-hoc wireless network to ensure the 
integrity and confidentiality of communication. When any wireless packet fails to be 
delivered to the destination or is lost during ad-hoc routing (which is common in both IEEE 
802.1x based-oriented or an ad hoc network wireless network), an ACK-failed (timeout) or 
AODV routing error RRER message will be triggered and both sides will be alerted to 
restore the last successfully received data packet and then re-synchronize the dynamic i-key 
and start the communication over again from Step 2 for the next packet transmission.  
Furthermore, before confidential data such as medical records or personal financial 
information are shared through a wireless ad-hoc network to other mobile devices, the 
source node can verify the authenticity of the destination node by requesting a response to 
decrypt a challenge message that the source node encrypted with the latest i-key holding 
with its signature. This sharing continues only when the other side passes the identity 
challenge; otherwise, the source node will mark the destination as invalid node and reject 
any further conversations to avoid data leaks or session hijacking. This verify-challenge 
mechanism in the i-key protocol can effectively detect any potential intruders and secure the 
wireless network by blocking both in-coming and out-going communication to prevent 
additional attacks. 
In addition, this encryption protocol is highly flexible. The dynamic secret i-key is 
regenerated every time for each individual data packet; therefore, the secret key-size can 
also adjust dynamically to fit different needs in different applications. For example, an on-
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line streaming system can temporarily increase the key size during the user identity 
authentication check to strengthen the complexity of ciphertext from eavesdropping by 
attackers and then lower the encryption/ decryption overhead by reducing the i-key size to 
improve the quality of services (QoS) of real-time live streaming while remaining under 
solid data protection. Thus, systems with existing security protection, such as SEND and 
SPR (Hu et al., 2003); (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2002) can still adopt this i-key encryption 
system to enhance data privacy and prevent malicious attacks against the wireless network. 
3.3 i-key protocol algorithm 
In additional to the RC4 encryption algorithm (Rivest Cipher 4, also know as ARC4 or 
ARCFOUR) (Rivest, 1992) that also used in WEP and TKIP protocol in IEEE 802.11 wireless 
networks, dynamic i-key protocol also utilizes the stream cipher as the security system 
model due to its efficiency, reliability and simplicity. Stream cipher takes in one byte to from 
a stream every time and produces a corresponding but different byte as the output stream, 
as shown in Fig. 4. 
 
X Y Z
IV PSK i-key
i-key Encryption 
Algorithm H 4 &
 
Fig. 4. Dynamic i-key encryption stream cipher 
Then, this stream cipher combines with the data before transmission over the wireless 
network by using an exclusive OR (XOR - ⊕) operation. It combines two bytes, one from the 
cipher and one from the data, and generates a single byte output result as 0 when the values 
of them are equal, otherwise the result is 1. In general, the strength of an encryption 
algorithm is primarily measured by how hard it is to decode the ciphertext (Edney & 
Arbaugh, 2004). Certainly there are stronger encryption procedures than this RC4-like 
dynamic re-keying algorithm applied in this i-key architecture, however, this simple XOR 
encryption method is considered very strong among all of the data encryption people use 
today for both wired and wireless communication (Edney & Arbaugh, 2004). 
One of the most important attributes of XOR operation is that if you apply the same value 
again to the first output result, the original value before the XOR operation is returned: 
 10110010 ⊕ 11011001 = 01101011 (1) 
 01101011 ⊕ 11011001 = 10110010 (2) 
This characteristic can rewrite as: 
 if A ⊕ B = C, then C ⊕ B = A (3) 
This is also how the decryption procedure works in the dynamic i-key system: 
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 Encryption: plaintext ⊕ stream cipher = ciphertext (4) 
 Decryption: ciphertext ⊕stream cipher = plaintext (5) 
Compared with other encryption systems, such as AES and RSA, XOR operation is 
relatively resource friendly and lightweight, ideally suited for mobile and hand-held 
computing devices since they have limited hardware computing ability and power 
resources. The only remaining challenge is how to generate a strong cipher stream that 
ensures the quality of encryption to avoid key deciphering and that protects data integrity 
over wireless radio communication. Encryption algorithms used in this i-key protocol consist 
of a Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) that establishes an initial permutation S-box of 
{0,1,2,.......,N-1} of the numbers 0 to 255 from a random key array with the typical size of 40 
to 256 bits and an Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA) that utilizes this output 
permutation S-box to generate the pseudo-random output sequence. The pseudocode for 
these two algorithms is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Pseudocode of KSA and PRGA Algorithm 
The KSA algorithm consists of two N loops of round operations that initialized the 
permutation array with a sequential number starting with 0 in the first loop and then 
rearranging the order by swapping each individual value with another byte in the same 
array with the following computational formula: 
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J(x) = (the value the particular index byte of S-box + the value of the same 
particular index byte of K-box) with any overflow ignored 
(6) 
The value of J is used as an index, as well as the values at that location, and are swapped 
with the target value in that location in S-Box. Sn is denoted as the result of the first “n”  
iterations from the loop of scrambling that represents the process have swapped each of 
S[0]...S[n-1], with a corresponding value of S[j]. The same process will start from the 
beginning of the initial S-box and is continuously repeated until it finishes swapping until 
the end of the array and produces the final version of S, S256 in our i-key system as the 
output permutation S-box.  
Once the S-box, the so-called state array, is initialized, it will be used as input in the next 
phase of i-key encryption algorithm, called the PRGA. This involves more calculation and 
swapping to generate the final key stream. A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) is 
an algorithm used to generate a random sequence of numbers, the elements of which are 
approximately independent. The PRGA in the i-key protocol is responsible for creating the 
cipher stream used to encrypt the plaintext based on the S-box value, whish is the output 
from the KSA in the previous step. It first initializes two indices, i and j to 0, and then loops 
over five operations that increase the value of i in each loop as the counter, increasing j 
pseudo-randomly by adding one value S[i] to it, then swapping the two values of the S-box 
pointed by the value of i and j, and outputs the values of the S-box that is pointed to by 
S[i]+S[j]. Note that every block of S-box/State array is swapped at least once, possibly with 
itself, within each completed iteration loop, and hence the permutation S-box/State array 
evolves fairly rapidly during the generation output loop phase (Fluhrer et al., 2001).  
The strength of a cryptographic system primary depends on two components: the algorithm 
and the encryption key. Since a system is only as strong as its weakest link, both components 
need to be strong enough to protect the unsecure wireless communication via the radio 
frequency (Edney & Arbaugh, 2004); (Chandra, 2005). In this i-key encryption protocol, first of 
all, the dynamic re-keying algorithm enormously enhances the level of protection by adding 
the extra secret i-key to the K-box. This increases not only the complexity of the secret key array 
but also effectively prevents key cracking and dictionary attacks. Second, it improves the level 
of data protection by creating a better initialized S-box/State array during the KSA algorithm 
when swapping the blocks based on the j index that are mixed with the value of additional 
secret i-key. Finally, it helps generate a better and stronger pseudorandom number stream in 
the PRGA algorithm phase that is used to encrypt the data packet sent via the wireless 
network. Therefore, this dynamic i-key encryption protocol strengthens the cryptographic 
system in both ways and provides a solid protection for both individual stand-alone wireless 
models as well as for mobile ad-hoc wireless networks. 
4. Security analysis 
Due to the nature of frequent changes in both topology and membership in mobile ad-hoc 
networks, the initial design of the wireless routing protocol has mainly focused on the 
effectiveness of packet forwarding and delivery to the target node, and not on security. 
Consequently, a number of attacks that take advantage of this weakness have been 
developed for use against data integrity or routing protocol in wireless communication. 
Transmitted data packets may be exposed to unauthorized access at anytime and anywhere 
due to the nature of radio broadcasting; therefore, it is essential to apply security protection 
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that prevents the reading or modification of confidential data by anyone who can receive the 
wireless signal. Using the secret key for data encryption is currently considered the most 
common way to protect data privacy in all kinds of computer communication; however, one 
of the static key or pre-shared key (psk) encryption’s biggest vulnerabilities is that an 
attacker can obtain the original secret key by monitoring the packet transmission or 
conducting a massive dictionary attack between any two nodes in the network. 
Theoretically, a 64-bit secret key is decipherable with approximately 1 to 2 million data 
packets (2 to 4 million for 128-bit secret keys) and in a matter of mere hours, attackers can 
detect enough data packets in an average busy network environment to decode the pre-
shared secret key (Chan et al., 2005). 
In addition, mobile nodes are often deployed in a wide area with very limited or no physical 
protection, rendering them very vulnerable to capture or hijacking. Once a single node has 
been compromised and the secret key revealed, an attacker can launch far more damaging 
attacks from inside the network without being detected. Hence, the encryption protocol that 
applies to the mobile ad-hoc network should not only prevent the encryption key from been 
revealed, but also be flexible enough to be adopted as a security enhancement by other 
existing routing protocols in such highly dynamic network environment. 
With the advanced dynamic encryption mechanism, i-key protocol ensures privacy of 
communication and protects sensitive data from eavesdropping by dynamically changing 
the secret i-key, which allows only the original sender and authorized receiver to decode the 
encrypted data packet via the secret i-key that they own. Therefore, this protocol overcomes 
the weakness of pre-shared key encryption and protects the wireless network against other 
attacks in the methods described below. 
4.1 WarDriving 
WarDriving is the act of scanning and searching for wireless network signals in a moving 
vehicle by any devices equipped with a wireless interface, such as PDAs or portable 
computers. Scanning software likes NetStumbler and Airmon-ng can report detailed 
information, including Service Set Identifier (SSID), MAC address, communication channel, 
signal strength and most importantly, the encryption protocol applied for each access point 
and wireless node. It can also record the location by connected to a GPS (Global Position 
System) receiver.  
In addition, there are several online web sites and databases such as WiGLE/ JiGLE, 
StumbVerter and Google Hotspot Maps where people around the world can report their 
discovery of each access point’s information. In July 2010, WiGLE/ JiGLE alone recorded 
23,182,272 pieces of access point data from 1,125,930,947 unique observations, which cover 
most of the major cities on five continents. Therefore, other people who do not have the 
proper equipment for doing wardriving can simply locate any near by access point by 
searching these sites. As an example, take the city of College Station, where Texas A&M 
University is located. More than six thousand access points have been detected and reported 
to the WiGLE/ JiGLE database. Fig. 6. demonstrates the distribution in a Google map. 
Those scanning tools, access point information sources and online databases are convenient 
for wireless network studies and research, but they also provide an advantage by letting 
hackers pick the most vulnerable entry point from an existing wireless network and 
expected to spend less time and effort to compromise the target node and its local area 
network. That is also why running a wardriving scan is usually hackers’ first step before 
they start any other kind of wireless attack. 
www.intechopen.com
Security and Dynamic Encryption System in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network   
 
479 
 
Fig. 6. The distribution of wireless access points in city of College Station, Texas 
The dynamic i-key encryption protocol can recognize and prohibit wardriving attacks by 
adding wireless packet pattern analysis to both access point and mobile node. Take 
NetStumbler for example; this unique pattern can be found in its 802.11 probe request frames 
(Tsakountakis, 2007). First, LLC encapsulated frames generated by NetStumbler contain the 
valise 0x00601d for organizationally unique identifier (OID) and protocol identified (PID) of 
0x0001. Second, the payload data size is usually 58 bytes with the attached hidden string 
“Flurble gronk bloopit, bnip Furndletrune!” for version 3.2.0, “All your 802.11b are belong to 
us” for version 3.2.3 and “ intentionally left blank 1” for version 3.3.0. In (Tsakountakis, 2007), 
authors also illustrate the pseudocode for the above pattern detection in a traditional wireless 
network and we extended this for dynamic i-key protocol used in a mobile ad-hoc wireless 
network (Fig. 7.). Once the i-key system detects the presence of wardriving activities, it 
generates several false probe requests to prevent any further attacks by misleading attackers 
with fake MAC address, SSID, channel and encryption protocol. Similar detecting signature 
parameters and policies shown in Fig. 8 can also add to the intrusion detecting system (IDS) to 
prevent additional attack on a wireless network. 
4.2 Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) 
In a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack, as shown in Fig. 9., the hacker places himself in the 
mid-point of the information flow between sender and recipient, which allows him to access 
all of the communication between them. If no proper security protection and data 
encryption protocol are applied to the wireless network, the attacker can effortlessly read 
the data, inject malicious packets, modify the information integrity or even block the 
communication from one side to another. In addition, a man-in-the-middle attack is hard to 
detect and prevent in a wireless network environment since everyone can easily capture the 
wireless packets transmitted from any mobile device to another or from the base stations. 
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Fig. 7. NetStumbler detecting pseudocode 
 
 
Fig. 8. NetStumbler signature parameters for CISCO IDS 
There are many different ways to interrupt the communication and allow hackers to insert 
themselves in the middle of the information flow by taking advantage of the protocol’s 
weak security design, for example, by using Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing 
(Plummer, 1982); (Wagner, 2001), Domain Name Server (DNS) spoofing (Klein, 2007); (Sax, 
2000) or via Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) (Rekhter et al., 2003). Once hackers are able to 
access the communication channel, the next step is to capture the current session, decode the 
secret key, decrypt the message and then modify the content and send it back. First, the 
attacker needs to reveal the secret key before he can successfully alter any data packets and 
launch an attack on both sender and recipient.  
However, due to the natural of this dynamic re-keying protocol, every single packet is secured 
by a unique and solid cipher stream composed of one hidden pre-shared secret key (psk), one 
unique IV value and one dynamic i-key, which together provide three strong layers of secure 
enhancement protection for wireless ad-hoc networks. Plaintext messages can only be decoded 
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by authorized recipients and senders who have the legal and updated i-key. Therefore, a real-
time man-in-the-middle attack would not succeed against this protocol. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Wireless man-in-the-middle attack example 
4.3 Blackhole attacks 
Blackhole attacks (Tamilselvan & Sankaranarayanan, 2008); (Hu & Perrig, 2004); (Chuah & 
Yang, 2006) (Fig. 10.) are similar to denial of services (DoS) attacks in traditional networks in 
that a compromised node in MANET participates in a routing protocol and attracts all 
packets by claiming to have a valid route to all destination nodes, but then drops all 
received data packets without forwarding them. This attack will not merely prolong the 
routing delay; in the worst case scenario, it can disrupt the entire network connection. 
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Fig. 10. Black hole attack in MANET 
www.intechopen.com
 Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Protocol Design 
 
482 
This attack is easily lunched against reactive protocols in a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network such as 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) (Johnson et al., 2001), Temporally Ordered Routing 
Algorithm (TORA) (V. D. Park & Corson, 1997) and Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) (Perkins & Royer, 1999), which assume that all nodes in a given ad-hoc network are 
trustworthy and that the data packet will forward to the node that first replies to the route 
reply message (RRM) in routing path discovery. To set in motion a blackhole attack, the 
attacker needs to decipher not only the pre-shared key (psk) but also the dynamic re-keying 
secret i-key; however, the attacker needs the added advantage of a dynamic re-keying 
mechanism that provides three different layers of data encryption and unique cipher 
streams to secure both the data and each mobile host’s secret key for every transmitted 
packet over the mobile ad-hoc wireless network. The i-key encryption protocol can easily 
prevent this form of attack in its very early stages by stopping the node from compromised 
and controlled by the attacker. 
4.4 Wormhole attacks 
In wormhole attacks, an adversary establishes a wormhole link by using either in-band or 
out-of-band communication as illustrated in Fig. 11. This direct link can be set up with a 
traditional wire, long-range wireless transmission or an optical link. Once this wormhole 
link is built up, the attacker can receive wireless packets on one end in the network, known 
as the original point, and then reply to them in a timely fashion at another location, as the 
destination point.  
Using this method, an attacker could relay an authentication exchange to gain unauthorized 
access without compromising any node or having any knowledge of the routing protocol in 
use (Chuah & Yang, 2006); (Eriksson et al., 2006). Because a wormhole attack is launched 
internally against the mobile ad-hoc network, default routing protocols and traditional 
security protections are unable to effectively detect or prevent this unique attack pattern. 
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Fig. 11. Wireless wormhole attack 
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Under the protection of the i-key encryption protocol, however, only the original sender and 
authorized receiver are able to decrypt the cipher text, by using the unique secret key in 
their possession, ensuring continued confidentiality and integrity for the data 
communication, as well as the authentication information between source and destination 
node. Therefore, even if wormhole attacks are launched inside the network, the 
cryptographic key that is used for both encryption and decryption during each node-to-
node communication still remains secret and the authentication information is still valid 
only to original node as well. 
4.5 Session hijacking 
In session hijacking, attackers take an authorized and authenticated session away from its 
owner and use it to establish a valid connection with the peer node, then snoop or modify 
the secret data. To successfully execute session hijacking, the attacker must accomplish two 
tasks: He first needs to stop the target node from continuing the session and then disguise 
himself as one of the legal client nodes (Welch & Lathrop, 2003). 
 
Server
`
Client
Session Established
Exchange session informtion - ID, Cookies
RST
RST
SYN
SYN/ACK
ACK
Session Established
Data
ACK
Attacker
 
Fig. 12. Session hijacking attack example in IEEE 802.11 wireless network 
The attacker can take the advantage of using Denial of Services (DoS) or a flood attack to 
achieve his first task for the session hijacking to temporarily interrupt the target’s session 
connection; however, in order to masquerade himself as the target, he also needs to obtain 
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the original secret key to maintain communication with the peer node. Because the i-key is 
dynamic re-keys for every packet, the secure key stream remains secret even if the session 
connection is interrupted. In this protocol design, described in the previous chapter, when 
communication is stopped or interrupted, the two parties will be notified by an IEEE 802.11 
ACK-failed (timeout) or AODV routing error RRER message to restore the last successfully 
received data packet and the secret i-key. Therefore the security protection remains even 
when consistency session connections are lost. 
4.6 Key cracking and dictionary attacks 
Any encryption system using only static pre-shared key (psk) or lacking well-defined re-
keying mechanisms are vulnerable to key cracking through the capturing of sufficient 
packets. Also, when choosing passwords for authentication or encryption system, many 
users select from a small domain and end up with a weak password. Those weak security 
systems and passwords enable adversaries to launch dictionary attacks that attempt to login 
into accounts by trying all possible password combinations. Once the correct password is 
discovered, attackers can crack the ciphertext easily and even carry out other attacks 
effortlessly (Pinkas & Sander, 2002). Fig. 13. below illustrates the key cracking attack with 
Aircrack-ng software.  
 
 
Fig. 13. Key cracking by Aircrack-ng 
Dynamic re-keying in the manner used in i-key protocol is advantageous because not only is 
every stream cipher unique for each packet, but also the i-key system provides the wireless 
ad-hoc network with an innovative and solid security protocol of up to 18,432 bits, the 
maximum for the data packet size in IEEE 802.1x wireless communication (Borsc & Shinde, 
2005), in key size. Therefore, attackers are unlikely to take the time required to capture 
enough packets before they can start to crack them or launch dictionary attacks against the 
system, because they know the longer they stay, the more likely their detection by a monitor 
system or firewall will be. 
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5. Performance evaluation 
In these experiments, both 25 and 50 mobile nodes with 2 access points randomly located 
over an area of 600m x 600m and 1100m x 1100m are simulated with different settings of the 
size of the secret i-key that correspond to other security protocols. Each simulation ran for 
200 simulated seconds with a radio transmission range set to 250 meters. Nodes coved by 
this range can receive the wireless signal and establish communication directly to the nodes 
within its ad-hoc range, while others rely on packets relayed by adjacent mobile nodes to 
deliver the message to the destination node. The physical and MAC layer setting is 
following the standard of IEEE 802.11 protocol with the data rate set from 1 to 20 MB/ s. 
The kernel of this test bed is based on Fig. 3. and Fig. 5. for the i-key dynamic encryption 
protocol with the rewrite extension from CMU Monarch (Monarch Project, 1998) to support 
this dynamic re-keying architecture model for AODV routing in mobile ad-hoc network. 
5.1 Protocol throughput 
In the throughput experiment, two mobile nodes are randomly selected in the deployed area 
and measured the average of total complete time for four different sizes of data transferred 
between them. This protocol throughput test allowed us easily to compare the performance 
of i-key with WEP, WPA and WPA2 system, which are the most popular and adopted 
security protocols in today’s wireless networking. As seen in Fig. 14, there is almost no  
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(b) 50 mobile nodes over 1100mx1100m area 
Fig. 14. Average total data transfer time for i-key encryption protocol 
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difference between each encryption approach in the lower transfer data size (24 and 48 MBs) 
and only a very small gap from the quickest WEP protocol with 64 bits to the slowest 
dynamic i-key 128 bits security system while transferred over 96 MBs of data. However, 
regarding data security, i-key encryption protocol not only strengthened the cipher by 
doubling the secret key size to provide a higher level of protection, but also dynamically re-
keying during the end-to-end communication to defend the network from unwanted 
intrusion and guarantee the privacy of wireless data exchange. 
5.2 Protocol delivery rate 
The simulation results for protocol average delivery rate are shown in Fig. 15. The 
percentage of successfully delivered packets is measured from the source to the destination 
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Fig. 15. Average end-to-end delay for AODV and i-key protocol 
www.intechopen.com
Security and Dynamic Encryption System in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network   
 
487 
node in five different data rate setting: 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 MB/ s. As expected, delivery rates 
dropped as the result of a greater number of lost packets and collisions in the wireless 
environment caused by the increased number of mobile nodes and data transfer speed. The 
nature of radio communication makes packet loss and collisions during transmission 
unavoidable. When this happens to the i-key dynamic encryption protocol, it only needs to 
retrieve the secret key from the most recently received data packet and then re-synchronize 
with both sides to continue the conversation. Consequently, the cost of time and overhead 
for packet loss and collision in the i-key protocol is quite low. This also is why the differences 
between i-key with other secure protocols are minimal. 
Both the complexity of the encryption system and the size of the ad-hoc network have a 
negative effect on performance. Obviously, AODV alone had the best delivery rate in all of 
the simulations, a result of the trade-off between security and performance. However, the 
relatively small gap between them also underscores that this i-key protocol can perform as 
efficiently as a non-security protection such as an AODV routing protocol while providing 
stronger data privacy through the dynamic i-key encryption system.  
Those results from throughput and end-to-end delay experiments also indicate that the i-key 
security mechanism has very low computational overhead and power consumption during 
both data encryption and decryption procedure, which is very critical, especially when most 
mobile nodes in the wireless network depend on limited processing ability and the finite 
energy provided by batteries (Wang & Chuang, 2004). 
6. Conclusion and future research 
Data integrity and privacy are the two most important security requirements in wireless 
communication today. Most mechanisms rely on pre-share key (psk) data encryption to 
prevent unauthorized users from accessing confidential information. However, maintaining 
security in the highly dynamic ad-hoc wireless network is full of challenges due to the 
complexity of data routing and the nature of the wireless transmission medium. 
In this chapter, we introduced a novel, efficient and lightweight encryption protocol that 
fulfils the need for security protection in wireless ad-hoc networks. This protocol ensures 
the privacy of communication from node to node and prohibits the modification of sensitive 
data by dynamically changing the secret key for data encryption during packet 
transmission. Under the protection of this protocol, only the original sender and authorized 
recipient are able to decode the cipher text using the secret key that is in their possession 
only. Therefore, the weakness of pre-shared key encryption is overcome and other wireless 
attacks are prevented. Experiment results with different network configurations and key 
sizes have been simulated. They indicate that this i-key protocol design is efficient, with low 
commutation overhead, while providing better and stronger data protection compared with 
other common security protocols in IEEE 802.11 wireless network. Furthermore, the 
dynamic encryption and decryption architecture in i-key protocol is flexible; other secure 
systems can also adopt it as a secondary security enhancement without compromising 
system performance. 
The future works include the integration of this existing work with the intrusion detection 
and locating system. This integration provides another layer of defense by effectively 
pinpointing the location of an attacker and helps the wireless secure system to react 
correctly and instantly. Also, the implementation of advanced dynamic secure protection for 
large-scale wireless communication, such as IEEE 802.16 WiMAX network and the 4G (4th 
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generation) of the cellular wireless network is also recommended, with evaluation of 
protocol performance in both lab software simulations and real-world experiments. 
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